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24 May 1967

READERS, ARE YOU THERE? Ruminations on the CIB

The situation for OCI is in essence an uncomplicated one. On one end of the line are policy-makers in the foreign and defense policy fields who, beyond a doubt, require information on which to base actions. On the other end of the line is OCI, possessed of much of the pertinent information. Conveying knowledge from OCI's fund to the policy-maker should not be difficult. The policy-makers are eager to be informed, and we are eager to inform. Until science opens new possibilities, there are apparently only two ways for us to inform the policy-maker--by telling him in person, or by writing to him. Perhaps the potentialities of oral briefing ought to be looked into, but admittedly they do not look good at first glance. As for writing, we stand ready to deliver information briefly, lengthily, factually, interpretively, prognostically, weekly, daily, hourly, or any way it is desired.

Given such positive attitudes on both ends, why is there anything less than complete satisfaction with the carrying out of our mission? In fact, there is an

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undercurrent of self-criticism and soul-searching. Outsiders do not seem to be heard from often--a significant fact in itself--but almost everyone in OCI, and many others in the Agency, have their favorite criticisms of OCI's production. These people may be wrong, but it is worth considering their views. Factually, from reader surveys, we know we are not getting to all our subscribers, at least with the Bulletin.

The condition of the information conduit from OCI to policy-makers bears more investigation. It is probable, whatever else such an investigation may reveal, that we have given too little attention to identifying the exact audience of most of our products, and to determining (or imaginatively calculating) its requirements. A considerable amount of effort in this direction has been expended in behalf of one publication--the PDB. But in light of the existence of that publication--and assuming its continuance--the audience and function of the Bulletin need to be reappraised.

For many years, we said the Bulletin was the President's daily. This is, of course, no longer true since we created a special daily for the President and

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gave Bulletin copy No. 1 to the Vice President. This is not to say that the President in one way or another derives no benefit from the Bulletin. Several of his assistants receive it. If they read it, they may well pass on some of its facts and ideas to the head man. Even if they don't pass on anything directly, their reading of it stands to influence the thinking of presidential advisers. And without the Bulletin, it is doubtful if there could be a PDB--at least produced in the present manner.

One course would be to recharacterize the Bulletin as the Presidential Advisers' daily, and then find out how they would like it handled. But maybe we already presume too much. Do the advisers want it at all? They are the only ones who can say. Hypothesizing that the answer may be yes, we should find out what they want in respect to subject matter, length, and detail. Would they prefer to have items sent by LDX through the day as they are written? Would they still like a daily compilation? In view of the fact that some of the advisers see the PDB, to what extent are they willing for the PDB and Bulletin to cover the same ground?

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Investigation could lead to the conclusion that (1) PDB readers require no other daily current intelligence publication, in which case we could disregard these people in adjusting the Bulletin, or (2) they do want something more, but are annoyed by repetition. It is imaginable that OCI might be of service by giving PDB readers a special supplementary daily (or whatever form of additional coverage they would like).

A similar problem arises with respect to the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and three other Pentagon moguls. They get both the PDB and Bulletin. We seem to have no current qualms about their receptivity to the PDB. But do they want the Bulletin? Do they read it? Do they find that it overlaps the PDB too much? Would they like it better--and use it more--if its contents were distinct? Through some channels, surely the Agency could get the answers...unless it feels they aren't necessary because the Bulletin can be written off in the case of PDB subscribers.

Suppose we set aside this tricky question of the Bulletin in relation to the PDB reader since we need more facts to work on. Suffice it to say that whatever the

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needs of the PDB reader turn out to be, we should try to satisfy them.

Pending guidance on this question, attention ought to be directed to the current intelligence requirements of the policy-makers who don't have access to the Daily Brief. They are, of course, about 90% of the Bulletin's addressees, and they include all the important foreign and defense policy officials except the top dozen. Under Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Special Assistants, top brass, etc.

What do they want? In the beginning of these notes, we spoke of the "eagerness" of the policy-makers to be informed. But looking the situation coldly in the face, we should not imagine that they are necessarily eager to be informed by CIA. Information they must have, but it comes to them from a variety of channels. The typical policy-maker tries to economize his efforts, and to read only what he requires in order to handle his job. If he is to take time out for our production, it must be because it does something worthwhile for him.

Our subscribers are mostly people who have definite assignments in respect to countries or types of problems. A few are generalists. They are the action officers for

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communications of their agencies between Washington and overseas posts. They see the incoming traffic before anyone else in Washington; they are called by phone when important messages are received during off-duty hours. It is unlikely that the CIB can rush news to them that originates with their own departments. The situation is not much better with respect to information originating in other departments. CIA may be aware of information before the policy-maker, but when CIA proposes a Bulletin item, all involved agencies get copies of the raw material, and it can then be passed to the policy-maker before the Bulletin comes out.

If the Bulletin cannot convey information from the field to the specialist ahead of anyone else, its first object should nonetheless be to assist him through its evaluation of the new data. That is why evaluation was made a key feature of Bulletin reporting from the start. Most intelligence from the field raises questions that have to be answered before there is real guidance for policy. Are the facts as alleged in the report? How significant is the development? What is it likely to lead to? One of the chief functions of CIA, and one it

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is particularly qualified to carry out, is to make an independent judgment on such questions. The record of the CIB in making an analytical contribution is generally good, based on an examination of the product itself. But the fact that some Bulletin addressees are not as interested in the publication as they might be suggests that OCI should lose no opportunity to exploit the specialized knowledge and experience of its staff and should take even more care to identify the primary intelligence questions of interest to the policy-maker and deal with them forthrightly.

More might also be done along the line of original analysis--putting pieces together to get a new picture, instead of waiting to comment on the picture as received from foreign posts.

Apart from assisting the policy-maker on his special concerns, the CIB has the second function of briefing him on the rest of the world scene. Well-informed as he is on his specialty, the policy-maker probably does not see much official traffic on other aspects of foreign affairs. Yet it is important for him to understand the context of world developments in which he is working. He has to "keep

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up with the world." One way he does this is through the Times and the Post. There he finds out what is publicly known. But he knows that the press is not privy to many important matters, and he knows that the press is not always complete or accurate about public events. Consequently, he needs to get from the government a confidential and expert reading of the world scene. Until we learn otherwise, it seems reasonable to believe that he would like a daily government publication, as a parallel to the press. The judgment of the past that CIA, because of a greater degree of objectivity, is in the best position to produce such a report is undoubtedly correct.

In general, the CIB has been this kind^d of an official world report for 16 years. Since 1958, the policy-maker has probably derived a measure of comfort from the knowledge that the Bulletin is inter-agency coordinated, even though many OCI analysts feel that coordination waters down the message. But the question is raised from time to time of how well the CIB keeps the reader "up with the world." We hear that some officials do not feel it is worth going down the hall to read. Usually there are not

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many items in the Bulletin, and it is only rarely that OCI's estimated appropriate maximum length (a dozen items) is reached. Why? The usual answer is that isn't anything more of "Bulletin size." It may be true that there are no other pieces as important as those that are printed (though this proposition could be debated), but the answer begs the question of why, as a matter of policy, we want to restrict the CIB to the cream of the cream. It also used to be said that the items should be "worthy of the attention of members of the National Security Council." This consideration seems out of date. There are only five members--the President, Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning. All but the last of these receive the PDB.

Undoubtedly the items should be worthy of the attention of the policy-makers who do not get the PDB, but what is the test of worthiness? It can hardly have any better base than what these persons would like to hear about. OCI's conception of the Bulletin has always been that of a report to be read in its entirety in a brief time. Possibly the readers do not insist on the

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"one gulp" approach. Possibly, too, not all of them feel obliged to read every item. They may look for those that interest them, just as they look through the Times. What they may well want is a feeling of confidence that the Bulletin provides the official supplement to the press in every necessary respect. They may consider themselves entitled to important intelligence of three general kinds: (1) matters affecting the security of the US; (2) matters affecting other US interests; and (3) "informational items," i.e., information that a policy-maker should have even though it does not directly affect the US.

It is difficult to believe that the Bulletin today contains all the important intelligence under these headings. It focuses on the handful of "top stories" of the day. By tradition, these should include some aspect of the most troublesome questions for the US. In competition for the remaining spots, dramatic events have an edge over less dramatic, if more important, developments.

Soundings should be taken among the readers in regard to their preferences as between the present highly selective approach, and one which would produce a more rounded

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picture of the world scene. It is entirely possible that if we understood better the requirements of our audience, and set out to fulfill them, we would overcome our problems of readership and find the policy-maker not abstractly eager for information, but positively eager to pick up his copy of the Bulletin.

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14 October 1969

THE MATERIAL OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

What kind of thing is put into the PDB? the CIB? the CIWR? Memos? Since current intelligence is not a grab-bag of any and all foreign happenings, there must be some guidelines on subject matter. Must be, but where are they? The fact is that those engaged in current intelligence over the years have steered largely by instinct. This instinct must have been fairly sound, or else we having been doing things wrong, because the subject matter of current intelligence shows a remarkable consistency since the beginnings of CIA. Even so, there have been few weeks without arguments as to whether particular events and situations should be reported in any form.

In recent times, the choice of subject matter for particular audiences has loomed as a special problem because of the appearance of the three-tiered CIB. The current trend toward linking the coverage of the PDB to that of the CIB Black Book underlines the importance of selecting properly for the Black Book.

The present notes are aimed at setting up a general framework within which subject matter can be considered.

It is a commonplace that intelligence is intended to

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help the policymaker. The question is how intelligence can do this. If you were by the policymaker's side constantly, you would have a good idea of his needs. You would know what problems he was working on, what he needed to know factually and interpretively, and what analysis of factors bearing on the future would be timely for his thinking. You would also know when he was not prepared to duck in reaction to some event you could see coming. The insight of the intelligence apparatus into the needs of the policymaker is usually not much better than that of the informed person outside government. Consequently, intelligence must have at hand some notions and principles of its own to guide it in the selection of material which, it fondly hopes, will enter significantly into the calculations of top executive officers dealing with foreign affairs.

What are the resources of intelligence in this regard? First, without any direct communication at all from the policymakers, the intelligence analyst has a considerable stock of information about US policies. To be sure, it is a traditional complaint of the analyst that he knows the policies of foreign governments better than he knows ours, that the State Department, White House, and Pentagon fail to let CIA know what US policy is, or that US policy is so confused that no one can

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understand it. No doubt there is often some justice in these complaints. Nonetheless, there are many policies that are clear, that are understood, and that may even be right.

It is important that intelligence not be wedded to policy, or it is likely to produce slanted reports. The distinctive merit of most CIA finished intelligence is exactly that it is free of the usual policy entanglements encountered in the line departments. If the sharpness of CIA's views and appraisals is occasionally blurred in the CIB because of the need to get the agreement of State and DIA, these hazards of coordination do not exist for the PDB, the Weekly, and the Memoranda. In cases of serious difference, even the CIB can register the Agency's independent views through the device of having State or DIA take a dissenting footnote. This will hardly ever be done of course except on the more important questions.

But if intelligence^X should not be in the business of justifying or protecting policy, it would be nonsense to contend that it should not be written in the knowledge of policy, or even with an intended relation to policy. The intelligence that deals with subjects on which Washington has definite and important policies is more important than intelligence on most subjects on which Washington has no policies.

Intelligence has the responsibility, among other things, of reflecting foreign reactions--good, bad, and indifferent--

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to US policies and programs. It is vital that policymakers see how things are working out so that they can judge whether to continue on course or take a different tack. Poor reactions to US policies can legitimately be thought of by the intelligence analyst as "unfavorable developments" as long as he recognizes that the policies involved are not accepted or rejected by intelligence as being correct. Such reactions are simply "unfavorable" to the policies concerned, with the conclusions to be drawn by the policymakers.

Above and beyond current policies are "US interests." This is a slippery one. Some US interests are clear; others are ill-defined or barely perceived. Moreover, there is often debate over where US interests really lie. Intelligence work would benefit from a compendium giving the current consensus of what US interests are in foreign countries and in broader international situations. Nonetheless, interests, when generally agreed on, are likely to be seen as more enduring than policies. It is not in the US interest, for example, for the USSR and China to augment their nuclear forces, for conflicts to break out between NATO members, for the economies of Western European countries to decline, for the Arab-Israeli dispute to run on unsettled, or for Latin American countries to be taken over by forces highly antagonistic to the US. In general, it is not in the US interest for the political, military, or economic strength of our foes to increase, for the strength of our friends and allies to decline.

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allies² to decline, or for countries of the Third World to fall into such parlous condition that there will eventually be an impact on the US.

It is then to these matters, involving US policies and US interests, that intelligence should especially direct its attention. In many cases, a development can easily be recognized as favorable or unfavorable. In many other cases, changes occur whose impact cannot be evaluated, or is debated. We know that something has happened in an area of interest to the US, but we do not know, or are not agreed, whether this puts us ahead or sets us back. We report it nonetheless, if it is a step that appreciably advances the scenario.

Cognizance must also be taken of developments in countries or subjects where the US interest is not large, or perhaps not

¹In the conventional sense, the only enemy of the US currently is North Vietnam. The term "foes" is used here also to include states generally antagonistic to the US. These would be the USSR, East Germany, China, and North Korea.

²The term allies here includes the 14 NATO partners of the US, plus Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Vietnam.

*South Korea, the Philippines,
Taiwan, Thailand*

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even discernible. Such developments as the outcome of an OAU meeting in Africa or restlessness among the Chilean military should be known, simply for general information, by a wider circle of US foreign affairs officials than just the people who work on these areas. The objective of informational reporting is to keep the secondary level generally well-informed without encroaching on the time of those officials who have the broadest responsibilities. Informational reporting should not be directed to the top policy-makers via the PDB and Black Book. At the same time, care must be taken to see that reporting is carried in the proper vehicle to reach the intended audience.

National elections are treated as matters of general information if reporting is not already called for because of a relation to US interests. It is basic to know what parties and personalities are running any country. Similarly, changes of government effected in less orderly ways, as by coups, are normally reported. Again, even if US interests are not involved, we usually report on considerable or sustained man-made violence anywhere, partly because it might have significant repercussions, but also for the primitive reason that this subject has a universal fascination.

A question that has nagged current intelligence for many years has been whether to report parallel to the press. Probably the best course is not to be inhibited by press coverage, but to plan our production on the basis of the importance we attach to the developments themselves. Even when an event draws considerable

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press attention, CIA's advantage is that its reporting is "official" in the sense that it is done by a government agency. The Agency, moreover, has access to all sources and it employs specialists on the subject matter. CIA reporting should therefore be sought after by even those officials who read the press fairly carefully, for it should have the reputation of being more reliable than the public media, eliminating distortions and inaccuracies, as well as containing information and analysis not in the public sphere.

The fact is, however, that the press provides stiff competition. It has many good writers and analysts and it is not cramped for space. CIA has to take full advantage of its assets if it does not want to allow the press to present a better story--one that is more complete, more understandable, and more readable.

At this point, and taking all the aforesaid into account, we can present a general scheme into which current intelligence will fall.

I. Direct threats to the security of the US, its personnel abroad, or its allies.

Examples of Developments:

- a. North Vietnamese intensify attacks in South Vietnam.
- b. New terrorists attacks are planned vs US personnel in Brazil.
- c. Moscow demands Allies get out of Berlin. (1958)
- d. Soviets install missiles in Cuba. (1962)

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II. Indirect threats to US security; threats to other US interests and policies.

A. Unfavorable developments regarding countries antagonistic to the US.

Examples:

- a. Soviet submarine fleet grows.
- b. China conducts another nuclear test.
- c. East Germany to continue hard-line policies.
- d. Soviets increase activities in African labor.
- e. North Vietnamese send reinforcements to Laos.

B. Unfavorable developments regarding allies of the US.

Examples:

- a. Japanese students protest against US-Japanese security treaty.
- b. Council of Europe members want to expel Greece. (What is unfavorable is not necessarily the desire of the Council, but the situation itself.)
- c. Saigon government fails to win broad support.
- d. Canada remains firm on troop cuts in NATO forces.

C. Unfavorable developments in other quarters where the US has interests.

Examples:

- a. Rise in Arab-Israeli violence.

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- b. Bolivian govt adopts a nationalistic, anti-US stance.
- c. Ultraconservatives strengthen their position in Czechoslovakia.
- d. US rights threatened at Wheelus Air Base.
- e. Venezuela planning an invasion of Guyana.

III. Developments that appear to be good for US security, other interests, and policies.

A. Favorable developments regarding countries antagonistic to the US.

Examples:

- a. Soviet space program suffers major setback.
- b. Economic stagnation in North Korea persists.
- c. Factional fighting continues in China.
- d. USSR's industrial growth lags.
- e. Soviet positions challenged at world Communist conference.

B. Favorable developments regarding allies of the US.

Examples:

- a. Turkish political crisis eases.
- b. Buddhists moderate attitude toward Saigon government.
- c. Japanese navy will expand its capabilities.

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C. Favorable developments in other quarters where the US has interests.

- a. Cambodia increases pressure on Vietnamese Communists.
- b. Anti-US sentiment waning in Peru.
- c. New Libyan government cool to Moscow.
- d. Political deterioration abated in Dominican Republic.

IV. Unevaluated developments regarding countries or subjects in which the US has an interest. (These may also be developments on which the evaluation is in dispute in Washington.)

Examples:

- a. Soviets and Chinese agree to talks on the border problem.
- b. Factional fight continues in Finnish Communist party.
- c. Justice Party is likely to retain control after Turkish elections.
- d. Dominican Vice President is trying to block Balaguer from reelection.
- e. East and West Germans hold talks on mutual problems.

V. Matters of general information, regardless of relation to US interests.

Examples:

- a. Student-labor unrest threatens Dahomey government.
- b. Chilean government fears discontent in the military.
- c. Serious friction exists among ruling group in Algeria.
- d. Inefficient Yugoslav enterprises may face liquidation.

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14 October 1969 (Rev)

THE MATERIAL OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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What are the resources of intelligence in this regard? First, without any direct communication at all from the policymakers, the intelligence analyst has a considerable stock of information about US policies. To be sure, it is a traditional complaint of the analyst that he knows the policies of foreign governments better than he knows ours, that the State Department, White House, and Pentagon fail to let CIA know what US policy is, or that US policy is so confused that no one can

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understand it. No doubt there is often some justice in these complaints. Nonetheless, there are many policies that are clearly understood.

It is important that intelligence not be wedded to policy, or it is likely to produce slanted reports. The distinctive merit of most CIA finished intelligence is exactly that it is free of the usual policy entanglements encountered in the line departments. If the sharpness of CIA's views and appraisals is occasionally blurred in the CIB because of the need to get the agreement of State and DIA, these hazards of coordination do not exist for the PDB, the Weekly, and the Memoranda. In cases of serious difference, even the CIB can register the Agency's independent views through the device of having State or DIA take a dissenting footnote. This will hardly ever be done of course except on the more important questions.

But if intelligence should not be in the business of justifying or protecting policy, it would be nonsense to contend that it should not be written in the knowledge of policy, or even with an intended relation to policy. The intelligence that deals with subjects on which Washington has definite and important policies is more important than intelligence on most subjects on which Washington has no policies.

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Intelligence has the responsibility, among other things, of reflecting foreign reactions--good, bad, and indifferent --to US policies and programs. It is vital that policymakers see how things are working out so that they can judge whether to continue on course or take different tack. Poor reactions to US policies can legitimately be thought of by the intelligence analyst as "unfavorable developments" as long as he recognizes that the policies involved are not accepted or rejected by intelligence as being correct. Such reactions are simply "unfavorable" to the policies concerned, with the conclusions to be drawn by the policymakers.

Above and beyond current policies are "US interests." This is a slippery one. Some US interests are clear; others are ill-defined or barely perceived. Moreover, there is often debate over where US interests really lie. Intelligence work would benefit from a compendium giving the current consensus, if one can be established, of what US interests are in foreign countries and in broader international situations. Interests are likely to be seen as more enduring than policies, which are subject to rapid changes. It is not in the US interest, for example, for the USSR and China to augment their nuclear forces, for conflicts to break out between NATO members, for the economies of Western European countries to decline, for

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the Arab-Israeli dispute to run on unsettled, or for anything to disturb the validity of the Rio Treaty. In general, it is not in the US interest for the political, military, or economic strength of our foes¹ to increase, for the strength of our friends and allies² to decline, or for countries of the Third World to fall into such parlous condition that there will eventually be an impact on the US.

It is then to these matters, involving US policies and US interests, that intelligence should especially direct its attention. In many cases, a development can easily be recognized as favorable or unfavorable. In many other cases, events occur whose impact cannot be evaluated, or is debated. We know that something has happened in an area of interest to the US, but we do not know, or cannot agree on, whether this puts us ahead or sets us back. We report it nonetheless, if it is a step that appreciably advances the scenario.

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The most important favorable or unfavorable developments, or events of undetermined impact in matters of US interest, are reported to the top policy-makers as well as to the secondary level of officials. In the case of daily reporting, the stories are carried in the PDB and Black Book and, to the extent that classification permits, in the other two books. Developments of somewhat less importance are not reported higher than to the secondary level of officials, and hence do not appear in the PDB and Black Book.

There are also events in countries or in subjects where the US interest is not large or perhaps not even discernible. Such developments as the outcome of an OAU meeting in Africa or tension between the government and Church hierarchy in Paraguay should be known, simply for general information, by a wider circle of US officials than simply those who work on these subjects. For this reason, selected items of "informational reporting" are carried in the Red and White Books, though they would not be worth the time of officials with the broadest responsibilities.

National elections are treated as matters of general information if reporting is not already called for because of a relation to US interests. It is basic to know what parties and personalities are running any country. Similarly, changes of government effected in less orderly ways, as by coups, are

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normally reported. Again, even if US interests are not involved, we usually report on considerable or sustained man-made violence anywhere, partly because it might have significant repercussions, but also for the primitive reason that this subject has a universal fascination.

A question that has nagged current intelligence for many years has been whether to report parallel to the press. Probably the best course is not to be inhibited by press coverage, but to plan our production on the basis of the importance we attach to the developments themselves. Even when an event draws considerable press attention, CIA's advantage is that its reporting is "official" in the sense that it is done by a government agency. The Agency, moreover, has access to all sources and it employs specialists on the subject matter. CIA reporting should therefore be sought after by even those officials who read the press fairly carefully, for it should have the reputation of being more reliable than the public media, eliminating distortions and inaccuracies, as well as containing information and analysis not in the public sphere.

The fact is, however, that the press provides stiff competition. It has many good writers and analysts and it is not cramped for space. CIA has to take full advantage of its assets if it does not want to allow the press to present a better story --one that is more complete, more understandable, and more readable.

At this point, and taking all the aforesaid into account, we can present a general scheme into which current intelligence will fall.

I. Direct threats to the security of the US, its personnel abroad, or its allies.

Examples of Developments:

- a. North Vietnamese intensify attacks in South Vietnam.
- b. New terrorist attacks are planned vs US personnel in Brazil.
- c. Moscow demands Allies get out of Berlin. (1958)
- d. Soviets install missiles in Cuba. (1962)

II. Indirect threats to US security threats to other US interests and policies.

A. Unfavorable developments regarding countries antagonistic to the US.

Examples:

- a. Soviet submarine fleet grows.
- b. China conducts another nuclear test.
- c. East Germany to continue hard-line policies.
- d. Soviets increase activities in African Labor.
- e. North Vietnamese send reinforcements to Laos.

B. Unfavorable developments regarding allies of the US.

Examples:

- a. Japanese students protest against US-Japanese security treaty.

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b. Council of Europe members want to expel Greece.

(What is unfavorable is not necessarily the desire of the Council, but the situation itself.)

c. Saigon government fails to win broad support.

d. Canada remains firm on troop cuts in NATO forces.

C. Unfavorable developments in other quarters where the US has interests.

Examples:

a. Rise in Arab-Israeli violence.

b. Bolivian govt adopts a nationalistic, anti-US stance.

c. Ultraconservatives strengthen their position in Czechoslovakia.

d. US rights threatened at Wheelus Air Base.

e. Venezuela planning an invasion of Guyana.

III. Developments that appear to be good for US security, other interests, and policies.

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b. Economic stagnation in North Korea persists.

c. Factional fighting continues in China.

d. USSR's industrial growth lags.

e. Soviet positions challenged at world Communist conference.

B. Favorable developments regarding allies of the US.

Examples:

- a. Turkish political crisis eases.
- b. Buddhists moderate attitude toward Saigon government.
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C. Favorable developments in other quarters where the US has interests.

- a. Cambodia increases pressure on Vietnamese Communists.
- b. Anti-US sentiment waning in Peru.
- c. New Libyan government cool to Moscow.
- d. Political deterioration abated in Dominican Republic.

IV. Unevaluated developments regarding countries or subjects in which the US has an interest. (These may also be developments on which the evaluation is in dispute in Washington.)

Examples:

- a. Soviets and Chinese agree to talks on the border problem.
- b. Justice Party is likely to retain control after

Turkish elections

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c. Dominican Vice President is trying to block Balaguer from reelection.

d. East and West Germans hold talks on mutual problems.

Most intelligence falling into the above four categories will be reportable to the top policy-makers.

V. Matters of general information, regardless of relation to US interests:

Examples:

a. Student-labor unrest threatens Dahomey government.

b. Chilean government fears discontent in the military.

c. Factional fight continues in Finnish Communist party.

d. Serious friction exists among ruling group in Algeria.

e. Inefficient Yugoslav enterprises may face liquidation.

Intelligence in this last category should not be directed higher than the secondary, or probably even tertiary, level of officialdom.

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12 November 1969

THE ROLE OF CIA'S DAILY PUBLICATIONS

Through the Central Intelligence Bulletin and the President's Daily Brief, as well as through other issuances, CIA is attempting to furnish substantive help to those engaged in making policy and conducting the business of foreign relations. It is possible to distinguish roughly three groups of policy-makers among our readers, though the dividing line between the groups is not sharp.

First is the top level of the generalists, beginning with the President, who are concerned with the entire spectrum of foreign relations. Next are those officials on a somewhat lower level who are almost equally interested in the whole spectrum but whose personal responsibility is for one segment of foreign relations or one functional subject. For a convenient name, these officials can be said to comprise the assistant secretary level. Finally there is the desk level, composed of the officials who have direct charge of relations with particular countries or of specific subjects. These are the country desk people at State and corresponding officials in Defense.

For all these groups, the Central Intelligence Bulletin provides an official, interpretive survey of the

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handful of the very top officials, the President's Daily Brief, closely linked in substance to the CIB, does the same.

Optimally we would like everything in the CIB to be news to our readers. In practice, this cannot be so since other current reporting, beginning with the press and radio, is reaching our audience. Moreover, our readers, from the nature of their jobs, do not see all the same material, so that the "newsiness" of the CIB will seem different to each.

The following are notes on the readers in each group and the way the daily publications may look to them.

Top-level Generalists: This group includes:

The President

The Vice President

Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

General Maxwell Taylor, Special Consultant to the President
Secretary of State

Under Secretary of State

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Secretary of Defense

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Secretary of the Army

Secretary of the Air Force

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Secretary of the Navy

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Attorney General

Secretary of the Treasury

Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness

It is to a few members of this group of ¹⁷~~16~~ that the

PDB is directed. All of these officials (except the President because of the PDB) receive or see the CIB Black Book; only two of them get the Red Book.

The problem for CIA of trying to convey fresh information is greatest in the case of the President, and his Assistant for National Security Affairs. There is elaborate machinery to keep the White House informed. State sends a cable summary twice a day. DIA sends its daily bulletin. Individual messages from State, Defense, and CIA sources in the field are passed promptly. The White House staff forwards a cable summary of its own to Mr. Kissinger. The White House situation room relays anything of great interest or urgency.

For all the competition, many of the items in CIA's dailies are probably "news" to the President and Mr. Kissinger. But while the freshness of factual information is obviously an important element in the utility of any reporting for policy-making purposes, it is not the only element. Orderly presentation of material, useful background, perspective, and interpretation have a great importance, for without them

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developments may be misunderstood or not understood at all.

CIA's strong suit, vis a vis the White House, is not in reporting the facts (construed as all the contents, factual or otherwise, of field reports), but in making an evaluated presentation of them. CIB/PDB items aim to be more interpretive than those in other publications. The PDB and Black Book are all-source publications, unlike any others. They exhibit a wider range of subject matter, at the same time reflecting more careful selection to carry only the items of genuine interest to top officials. And CIB/PDB items try to be concise, bringing out clearly the essentials of a story and sacrificing the unnecessary details. In sum, CIA's daily publications should give the top generalist a more meaningful classified summary of foreign developments as they occur than he can get in ^{any} other way.

The top generalists aside from the President and his immediate staff are serviced with some current intelligence materials, though not as lavishly as the White House. In their case, it is not so much of a problem for CIA's dailies to be newsy.

Assistant Secretaries and High Level Specialists: This group includes:

Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis

Director of Defense Research and Engineering

Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Staff, Air Force

Chief of Naval Operations

Commandant of the Marine Corps

* Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury for National Security Affairs

Lee DuBridge, Director, Office of Science and Technology

Director, USIA

Director, Bureau of the Budget

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

None of these 18 officials receives the PDB. All receive the Black Book except one, who gets the Red Book. Two others get the Red in addition to the Black.

The question may be raised as to how useful the CIB is to the Assistant Secretaries since they are, in a sense, specialists. It is probably true that CIB items on, say, the Middle East will not come as a complete revelation to

the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. There is a high probability that he is aware of the source materials and he may not even require the treatment of them provided by CIA in terms of analysis, interpretation, etc. At the same time, one should not exclude the possibility that the CIB will call things to the Assistant Secretary's attention that his staff has, for one reason or another, not passed to him. Nor should one discount the possibility that CIA's analysis will prove to be original and helpful.

But more important, the items outside the Assistant Secretary's own area of responsibility are not of academic interest; they help to keep him equipped for his generalist role. Assistant Secretaries are, after all, high level officials who join in major conclaves on US foreign policy across the board. It is reasonable to believe that the Bulletin builds up the stock of facts and interpretations that go to form the judgment and advice of Assistant Secretaries as of the generalists above ~~him~~, *them*.

The Desk Officer. The situation with respect to the desk level in State and Defense is murky. We have not identified all the officials we would like to reach and we know little about what desks actually receive the Red and White Books, though many copies of each go to State and Defense.

(None of the desks gets the Black Book.) No one would argue with the proposition that anyone working in the foreign relations field should be well-informed on world developments generally. Assuming that it gets to him, the CIB helps to keep the desk officer well-informed. He does not normally participate in general policy formulation, however, and presumably he will rarely draw on CIB information on his sector of foreign relations to carry out his work. The desk officer needs CIB reporting on his own subject even less than the Assistant Secretary, for he is thoroughly informed on the details, and he has his own analyses and interpretations. He is probably interested, however, in any new ideas that CIA may have.

Possibly the CIB is most useful to the desk officer in its reporting on countries or subjects closely related to his own. He may well not have seen this traffic and yet the developments it describes could have an important bearing on his work.

Overall, it would appear that the desk officer has much less need for the CIB than have the generalists and Assistant Secretaries. This is not surprising. Throughout its history, the Bulletin has been intended as a vehicle for keeping the highest level informed. Its displacement by the PDB in the case of the President is more apparent than real since the PDB is built on the foundation of the Bulletin.

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8 December 1969

THE CIWR

The Current Intelligence Weekly Review provides an official, interpretive survey of the most important foreign developments on a weekly basis.

It is up-to-date, but in the sense of a weekly magazine rather than a newspaper. The cut-off time of its information is almost a day before it gets to the reader.

The CIWR is intended to give a more rounded story than the CIB. It deals with the latest developments in a more generalized way, and it gives more play to analysis and background. (Background is more important if the subject is not treated frequently in the weekly.)

The analytical elements that are desirable in a CIB item are even more desirable in a weekly article. Especially appropriate for treatment in the weekly are the definition of objectives, identification of trends, clarification of US interests, and conjecture as to future developments.

The subject matter for the CIWR is the same as for current intelligence generally. Favorable and unfavorable developments from the US point of view, and developments of undetermined impact in matters of US interest, are the chief grist. There is no flat requirement that major foreign events featured in

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the press be covered in the Weekly. On the other hand, it is desirable that they be dealt with, if only for the purpose of giving an official view, taking account of classified traffic. It is to be hoped that the Agency will have substantive information going beyond the press, but even when this is not so, we can probably contribute something by way of analysis.

The adjunct to the weekly known as the Special Report is a very different creature from a regular weekly article. While it is factually up-to-date, its purpose is not to relate the most recent developments but to provide a broad (though not exhaustive) review of a current topic deserving of wide attention. It differs from the Intelligence Memorandum in that the latter is usually used to convey a particular message and is often done on short notice.

The readership of the CIWR is not as well defined as that of the daily publications. Only a few recipients of the PDB and Black Book on the top generalist and assistant secretary level are direct addressees of the Weekly Review. Others may get the Weekly via internal routing in their departments. A large number of copies are sent to the Defense Department; only half a dozen go to State.

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Mr. Kissinger, however, is one of the direct addressees, and he has said that he holds the Weekly in high esteem. He reads it thoroughly each week and marks passages for the President.

It would be good to know that the Secretary of State, the Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries, and the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary are readers of the CIWR, though they are not direct addressees. Anyway, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is the best single reader we could have, except for the President himself. And the President may read at least parts of the Weekly.

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27 February 1970 R

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE AND ITS AUDIENCE

What is the scope of current intelligence and for whom is it written? There is some general knowledge on these points, for the production of current intelligence on a systematic and comprehensive basis by CIA is well known and it now has a history extending over nearly a quarter of a century. Nonetheless, those not engaged in current intelligence sometimes express an interest in obtaining fuller information. The present article is an effort to satisfy this healthy curiosity.

The best single insight into the origins and purposes of current intelligence is afforded by the fact that in January 1946 President Truman asked the Central Intelligence Group to provide him with a daily intelligence summary. He said that he had many reports coming to him from different sources, but he needed one compendium that would draw together and evaluate the most important intelligence. The CIG responded with the Daily Summary under ~~WNYNN~~ the editorship of [REDACTED] 25X1A

The CIA daily has continued in an unbroken line down to the present, though its title has changed several times and it has been produced by different CIA offices under various procedures.

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Important milestones in the history of the daily were passed in 1951, when the new Office of Current Intelligence launched the Current Intelligence Bulletin; in 1958, when the publication became the Central Intelligence Bulletin, coordinated with State and Defense; and in 1968, when the Bulletin appeared in three editions--the Black, Red, and White Books--based on a descending order of classification.

Almost from the beginning, the readership of the CIA daily spread from the White House to include all the principal officers concerned with foreign and defense matters. The audience has also traditionally included the lower policy levels, non-policy officials engaged in carrying out programs and operations, and the intelligence community itself. The daily has thus served a great variety of officials. It is, of course, desirable that the publication be available to all in the government who have a need for it. Nonetheless, the first consideration has always been for the requirements of the top policy level.

For the President himself, a special daily, now called the President's Daily Brief, has been written for the past nine years. It is based largely on the Black Book Bulletin, though it draws on other material as well.

Although current intelligence began as a daily report, it has assumed various forms, all about as old as the daily itself. The forefather of today's Current Intelligence Weekly Review was a weekly produced by the CIC beginning in 1947. Intelligence memoranda, which have long held a major role in finished

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intelligence, also go back to the CIG period.

The Central Intelligence Bulletin and the Current Intelligence Weekly Review are produced by the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI). The articles in these publications are written by OCI, the Office of Strategic Research (OSR), and the Office of Economic Research (OER), with occasional contributions from other offices in the Directorate of Intelligence.

Over the years, there have additionally been other periodicals designed to do specific jobs for a particular set of readers. One such is the daily Vietnam situation report.

TOP CONSUMERS--THE POLICYMAKERS

Since the policymakers are the chief customers of current intelligence, it is important to identify them individually, and to keep them well in mind during the production process. In this way the product will have the best chance of hitting the mark. It is possible to distinguish roughly three groups of policymakers, though the line between them is not precise.

First are the top level generalists, beginning with the President, who are concerned with the entire spectrum of foreign relations. Next are those officials on a somewhat lower level who are almost equally interested in the whole spectrum but whose personal responsibility is for one segment of foreign relations or one functional subject. For a convenient name,

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these officials can be said to comprise the assistant secretary level. Finally there is the desk level, made up of the officials who have direct charge of relations with particular countries or of specific subjects. These are the country desk people at State and corresponding officials in Defense.

Among the various intelligence issuances, it is easiest to deal first with the case of the Bulletin because it is, in many ways, basic to other production, and there is more detailed information about its readership.

The prime function of the Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB) is to provide all the policymaking groups with an official, interpretive survey of the most important foreign developments each day. The Bulletin, however, has a slightly different usefulness to each of the groups. This variation arises from the different responsibilities of the officials, the different intelligence and information service they receive, and from the fact that, substantively, the CIB may be regarded as having two aspects. It carries material--which can generally be called factual, though it is not always that--drawn from field reports, and it carries material originating with analysts in Washington. This additional material may be interpretive, evaluative, premonitory, analytical in the narrow sense, or of a background nature. For convenience, it is useful to apply the single term "analysis" to material originating in Washington.

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Top-Level Generalists

This group presumably is more interested in the analysis offered in the CIB and PDB than in the factual content. The group includes about 16: the President, the Vice President, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Henry Kissinger), the Special Consultant to the President (Gen. Maxwell Taylor), the Secretary of State and the Under Secretaries, the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary, the three service Secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of the Treasury. Except for the President, who has the PDB, all members of this group receive the Black Book Bulletin. Fewer than a half dozen of them receive the PDB. Mr. Kissinger and Gen. Taylor are the only ones of this group who get the Red Book.

There is elaborate machinery to keep the White House informed of world developments. Important messages from the field are sent there, the Situation Room relays news of great interest or urgency, and the White House receives several compilations of intelligence, such as the State Department's cable summary and DIA's daily summary. With service like this, the White House does not need a straight rendition of the "facts" from CIA; it needs, and receives, an analytical interpretation of events. There are other distinctive features of CIA's dailies. The PDB and the Black Book Bulletin carry material of higher classification than other publications, and the PDB is the only all-source document. The CIA dailies exhibit a wider range

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of subject matter than the State or Defense dailies. They also strive particularly for a direct style, highlighting the essentials of a story. In sum, CIA's dailies should give the top generalist a more meaningful classified summary of foreign developments as they occur than he can get in any other way. The factual content of the CIA dailies may have more news value to top generalists outside the immediate White House circle than to those inside it, since those outside are not as lavishly serviced with intelligence as the Chief Executive.

In speaking of "CIA's dailies" it should be borne in mind that the Bulletin, though not the PDB, is coordinated with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the State Department, and with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The developments covered in the Bulletin, however, are selected by CIA, which also produces the draft items. The drafts are sent by long-distance Xerox (LDX) to INR and DIA, whose representatives then come each weekday afternoon to the CIB Panel to certify changes worked out over secure phone lines by the analysts involved in the three departments.

Generalizations about the process of coordination and its results are difficult to make. So much depends on the personal factor, which varies from case to case. It is probably correct to say that normally coordination produces relatively small changes in the items, though sometimes changes are substantial. The opposite numbers of some CIA

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analysts are easy to work with; some have reputations for nit-picking; others, reflecting their department's views, tend to disagree with CIA's basic appraisal of a situation. Most disagreements are worked out to mutual satisfaction, but a tenacious disagreement may have to be resolved by higher levels in the departments concerned. In the case of an insoluble difference on an important substantive matter, INR or DIA, or both, can take a dissenting footnote. Usually this does not occur more than a few times a year.

Assistant Secretaries and High-Level Specialists

The group of policy-makers at this level has about 18 members. Among them are all the Assistant Secretaries of State and Defense, the military heads of the three services, the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget, USIA, and the executive Office of Science and Technology, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. With one exception, these officials, like the top generalists, are Black Book readers. Two of them also get the Red Book.

Assistant secretaries are both specialists and generalists. In the latter role, they join in major conclaves on US foreign and defense policy across the board. Although consumer research in the field of current intelligence is not well developed, it is reasonable to suppose that the Bulleting builds up the stock of facts and interpretations that help to form the judgment and advice of these officials. The Bulletin is probably of

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less service to the assistant secretaries in the area of their own responsibilities. The CIB articles on, say, the Middle East are not likely to come as a complete revelation to the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. There is a high probability that he is aware of the source materials and, of course, he and his staff are themselves engaged in analysis. Nonetheless, the coordinated view of the intelligence community presented in the CIB may be helpful.

The Desk Officer

The situation with respect to the Desk Level in State and Defense is unfortunately murky. Desk officers would seem to be the intended recipients and users of the Red Book Bulletin, but whether in fact they are is questionable. The difficulty may originate from the need of desk officers in State to go to a special reading room to see codeword publications. For this reason, copies of the Red Book are sent to a central point rather than directly to individuals.

Apart from the fact that the Bulletin will always provide any reader with a good way of keeping up with the world, it is apparent that the desk officer has less need of the CIB than the generalist does. He is not required, for example, to maintain worldwide knowledge in order to participate in general policy formulations. Whether the desk officer finds value in

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CIB reporting on his own country or subject is conjectural --the question is whether you can tell a specialist anything in his field. To a greater degree than the assistant secretary, he is already informed on the details, and he has his own analyses. One hopes that his mind would not be closed to interpretations offered by CIA. Possibly the CIB is useful to the desk officer in its reporting on countries or subjects closely related to his own. He may not have seen the field reports and yet they could have an important bearing on his work.

The Weekly and Memoranda

The intended readership of CIA's weekly is approximately the same as that of the Bulletin. Dissemination of the Current Intelligence Weekly Review (CIWR), and of the secret version, the Current Intelligence Weekly Summary (CIWS), is handled in much the same way as that of the Red and White Book Bulletins, most copies going to central points in State and Defense. It is consequently difficult to identify individual readers. Only a few of the top generalists and assistant secretaries are direct recipients of the CIWR. Of this group only the Secretary of the Treasury gets the CIWS. President Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, however, is one of the direct addressees of the CIWR. He has reported that he holds the Weekly in high esteem, reading it thoroughly each week and marking it for the President.

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Memoranda form a substantial part of the output of the Office of Current Intelligence and of other offices in the Directorate of Intelligence. The dissemination of each memorandum is decided separately, though, in fact, many of them receive a "standard" dissemination which includes most of the policy-making readers of the Bulletin. Memoranda have often received high praise as exactly filling the needs of the recipients.

THE MATERIAL OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

In the choice of subject matter for the CIB, the PDB, the CIWR, and memoranda, those engaged in current intelligence over the years have had to steer largely by instinct in lieu of written guidelines. This instinct must have been fairly sound because, despite continual debate the subject matter of current intelligence shows a remarkable consistency since the beginning of CIA. Nonetheless, it is still true that few weeks go by without debate as to whether particular events or situations should be reported, and if so, in what publication. Granting that there must be debate if the activity is to be vital, it is still possible to clarify the rationale behind the typical material of current intelligence.

In the consideration of what to report, there are two guideposts: one is that intelligence is intended to help the policy-

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maker; the other is that the policymaker is chiefly concerned with what affects the US and what the US can do to affect foreign situations.

There is no question but that intelligence analysts are in the best position to be helpful when they are in close communication with the policymaker. Lines of contact between the policy and intelligence sides of the government at the highest level are, in fact, excellent¹, but they are used chiefly to deal with the most vital matters. In the normal production of current intelligence, the analysts must have the imagination to see what will probably be valuable to policy officials.

This imagination needs the reinforcement of a knowledge of US policy and an idea of US interests. Intelligence, of course, should not be written to defend or to attack policy. However, intelligence has the responsibility, among other things, of reporting foreign developments in the light of US policies--of showing how these developments are thwarting or assisting what Washington is trying to do. It is essential that policymakers be able to get a straight story of how things are working out so that they can judge whether to continue on course or take a different tack.

Policies are based on national interests, which are presumably more enduring. In some areas and situations of the

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world, there are US interests but no policies; it is simply impractical to develop and implement policies. It is not in the US interest, for example, for the USSR and Communist China to augment their nuclear forces, but we cannot have a policy on this subject. Some national interests are ill-defined or barely perceived, and, of course, debate over where US interests really lie is a common feature of American political life. Still, many interests would be accepted by the overwhelming majority of citizens. For example, it is in our interest for the West European countries to be strong politically and economically, and for Japan to play an active and constructive role in the Far East; it is not in the US interest for the Arab-Israeli dispute to run on unsettled, or for anything to disturb the validity of the Rio Treaty.

In general, it is not in the US interest for the political, military, or economic strength of our foes¹ to increase, for the strength of our friends and allies² to decline, or for the countries of the Third World to fall into such shaky condition that there will eventually be an impact on the US.

¹In the conventional sense, the only current enemy of the US is North Vietnam. The term "foes" is used here to include also those states generally antagonistic to the US. Preeminent among them are the USSR, East Germany, Communist China, and North Korea.

²The term allies here includes the 14 NATO partners of the US, the 21 Rio Treaty partners, plus South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Thailand, Australia, & New Zealand.

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It is then to these matters, involving US interests and policies, that intelligence should especially direct its attention. Developments in conformity with US interests and policies can be regarded as "favorable;" developments opposed to US interests and policies can be considered "unfavorable." Intelligence producers, of course, do not have to be in personal agreement with the policies involved. In many cases, a development can be easily recognized as favorable or unfavorable. In numerous other cases, the impact of events cannot immediately be evaluated, or there is debate about the impact. We know that something has happened in an area of interest to us, but we do not know whether this puts us ahead or sets us back, or we cannot agree on the matter. We report the event nonetheless, if it is a step that appreciably advances the scenario.

It was established from the beginning that one of the main obligations of the Bulletin was to preclude "surprises" for official Washington. Notably, it must sound the alarm for any imminent military move by foreign powers and for any abrupt political action, such as a coup.

A troublesome question for current intelligence has been whether to report on events covered in the press. Probably the best course is not to be inhibited by press coverage, but to plan current intelligence production on the basis of the importance attached to the developments themselves. For one thing, even when developments draw considerable press

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attention, CIA's advantage is that its reporting is "official" in the sense that it is done by a government agency, and one with access to all sources. Even officials who read the press carefully should be able to feel that CIA reporting is more reliable than the public media, eliminating distortions and inaccuracies. For another thing, even on well-covered events, CIA in most cases will have an analytical contribution of its own.

The press, of course, provides stiff competition for current intelligence. It has many good writers and specialists, and it has virtually none of the space problems characteristic of intelligence publications. Obviously, CIA has to take full advantage of its assets if it does not want to allow the press to present a more complete, more understandable, and more readable story.

With the foregoing considerations in mind, it is possible to present a general framework into which all current intelligence will fall. The one offered below is certainly only one way of looking at the subject; other schemes could be developed.

- I. Direct threats to the security of the US, its personnel abroad, or its allies.

Examples of Developments:

- a. North Vietnamese intensify attacks in South Vietnam.
- b. New terrorist attacks are planned vs US personnel

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in Brazil.

- c. Moscow demands Allies get out of Berlin. (1958)
- d. Soviets install missiles in Cuba. (1962)

II. Indirect threats to US security and threats to other US interests and policies.

- A. Unfavorable developments involving countries antagonistic to the US.
 - a. Soviet submarine fleet grows.
 - b. China conducts another nuclear tests
 - c. East Germany to continue hard-line policies.
 - d. Soviets increase activities in African labor.
 - e. North Vietnamese send reinforcements to Laos.
- B. Unfavorable developments involving allies of the US.

Examples:

- a. Japanese students protest against US-Japanese security treaty.
- b. Bolivian government adopts a nationalistic, anti-US stance.
- c. Saigon government fails to win broad support.
- d. NATO faces open dispute on the Greek question.
- C. Unfavorable developments in other quarters where the US has interests.

Examples:

- a. Rise in Arab-Israeli violence.
- b. Indian Premier Gandhi suffers political reversal.
- c. Ultraconservatives strengthen their position

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in Czechoslovakia.

d. US rights threatened at Wheelus Air Base.

III. Favorable developments in terms of US security, other interests, and policies.

A. Favorable developments involving countries antagonistic to the US.

Examples:

- a. Soviet space program suffers major setback.
- b. Economic stagnation in North Korea persists.
- c. Factional fighting continues in China.
- d. USSR's industrial growth lags.
- e. Soviet positions challenged at world Communist conference.

B. Favorable developments involving allies of the US.

Examples:

- a. Turkish political crisis eases.
- b. Buddhists moderate attitude toward Saigon government.
- c. Japanese navy will expand its capabilities.

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C. Favorable developments in other quarters where the US has interests.

- a. Cambodia increases pressure on Vietnamese Communists.
- b. The disputants are trying to end the civil war in Yemen.

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- c. New Libyan government cool to Moscow.
- d. Situation is calm as federal Nigerian police move into former secessionist enclave.

IV. Unevaluated developments involving countries or subjects in which the US has an interest. (These may also be developments on which the evaluation is in dispute in Washington.)

Examples:

- a. Soviets and Chinese agree to talks on the border problem.
- b. Serious friction exists among ruling group in Algeria.
- c. Officials have agreed on a treaty for a Nordic economic union.
- d. East and West Germans hold talks on mutual problems.

Most intelligence falling into the above four categories will be reportable to the top policy-makers.

V. Matters of general information.

Examples:

- a. Student-labor unrest threatens Dahomey government.
- b. The Tanzanian government will take over the country's entire wholesale trade network.
- c. Factional fight continues in Finnish Communist party.
- d. Some violence has followed the Lesotho prime minister's seizure of power.
- e. Inefficient Yugoslav enterprises may face liquidation.

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This last category of "informational" items requires a few words of explanation. Given the US interest in the affairs of antagonistic states, allied and friendly states, and in the condition of the Third World generally, it follows that there is no country in which US interests can be said to be non-existent. At the same time, there are countries in which developments typically do not have an immediate significance for the US. It is clearly out of the question to report these to the top policymakers. On the other hand, it is necessary to keep the analytical tools well sharpened, since events anywhere can take a twist that puts them squarely in the center of US attention. The proper course would seem to be that which is, in fact, followed, namely to record the events most significant for the foreign country itself in lower level issuances, especially the White Book Bulletin. This edition is sent mainly to non-policymaking specialists on the operating end of government programs. In this way the large group of White Book readers are given a broader picture of world developments than they would have if they received only those Black and Red Book items that can be carried in the White Book. Results of a questionnaire in 1969 show that the readers appreciate this fuller coverage, even when it ^{is} not essential to the performance of their jobs.

Compared with the Bulletin, the Current Intelligence Weekly is intended to present a more rounded story of developments.

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It looks at them with greater perspective, and it includes more background material, especially if the subject is not dealt with frequently. The analytical elements that are desirable in a CIB item are even more desirable in a Weekly article. Especially appropriate are the definition of foreign objectives, identification of trends, clarification of US interests, and conjecture as to future developments. The adjunct to the Weekly known as the Special Report is a different creature from a regular weekly article. While it is factually up-to-date, its purpose is not to relate the most recent developments, but to provide a broad (though not exhaustive) review of a current topic worthy of wide attention.

Intelligence memoranda follow no set pattern and are only as long as necessary to do the job. Some are quite short, but many are fairly lengthy. The question often arises as to why the memorandum is used in preference to the weekly article or Special Report. Usually the choice is made for one or more of four reasons. First, the report may not be deemed of enough general interest to run in the weekly, even in the Special Report series. Analysts sometimes use memoranda to convey a narrowly-focussed message or to explore technical matters; frequently they are answering specific questions posed by policy officials. Second, the report must sometimes be written against a short deadline and get to the requester before the weekly will appear. Third, to meet the requirements, the report may have to exceed even

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the generous length allowance of the Special Report. Lastly, restricted dissemination may be necessitated by the classification or the delicacy of the subject matter.

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There is little playback from the readers of current intelligence. This is not surprising, unfortunate as it may be. Busy officials are not apt to call and say how illuminating they found a memorandum, or write comments in the margin of the Bulletin and return it, though both things have happened. The policymaker tends to take his intelligence for granted, like the paper at the door in the morning, unless he has specifically asked for something. But despite the dearth of cheers or boos, the evidence indicates that the readers are there, at least some of them some of the time. The situation seems to be best where it counts most, at the highest level. With some consumer research and imagination, it might be possible to make current intelligence of more service to the lower policy levels.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE AS WE HAVE KNOWN IT

Amid the swirl of stimulating discussion about possible new approaches to current intelligence, it may be useful to try to describe what it has been, particularly in terms of its subject matter.

25X1A In January 1946 President Truman asked the new Central Intelligence Group, soon to be renamed the CIA, to provide him with a daily intelligence summary. He said he had many reports coming to him from different sources, but he needed one compilation that would draw together and evaluate the most important intelligence. The CIG responded with the Daily Summary under the editorship of [REDACTED]. The CIA daily has continued in an unbroken line down to the present, though its title has changed twice and it has been a function of different offices in the Agency. Since 1951 it has been produced by the Office of Current Intelligence, with the collaboration of the Office of Economic Research, and, in recent years, the Office of Strategic Research.

President Truman did not specify what he meant by "important intelligence." It was left to the CIG to

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make its own judgment of importance, and to decide what intelligence was. CIG's course was not to adopt a definition of intelligence and proceed in conformity with it, but to steer largely by instinct informed by the experience CIG members had gained in the intelligence field during World War II. A definition of intelligence emerges from an examination of what CIG and CIA over the years have regarded as falling under this heading. Individuals have, of course, had somewhat different notions and there has always been--as there is today--plenty of room for argument. "That isn't intelligence," is a comment that can be heard fairly often, though the person making it usually will not be ready to say exactly what intelligence is. Looking at the record, the ostensive definition of intelligence has been remarkably consistent and quite broad.

It is useless to try to define intelligence narrowly, as, for example, the product only of clandestine collection. Such definitions simply do not match the way the word has come to be used. Reports from US ambassadors and attaches, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] monitored radio broadcasts and telecasts, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] all go to form the intelligence "take."

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While a press report in itself is not "intelligence," there is no doubt that it is often the factual basis of finished intelligence, which will normally be interpretive.

Not only is it unprofitable to limit the definition of intelligence by method of collection; it is also unrewarding and confusing to try to limit it in terms of subject matter aside from its dealing with things "foreign." Intelligence obviously can treat political, economic, sociological or military subjects; it is equally true that it can concern friend, foe, or neutral, good news or bad, danger or opportunity. Looking back over the material carried in the CIA daily these many years, the only characteristics common to all the reports are that they convey foreign information--i.e., they concern foreign countries, persons, and organizations--and they have been prepared by US intelligence officials. In other words, intelligence is official information on foreign developments. It may have been acquired from public media and, even as interpreted, differ little from what the man in the street knows, or it may have been expensively acquired by elaborate collection methods and constitute sensitive information known to only a few. Whatever its subject matter, it is ought to be more accurate and authoritative than non-official writing

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since it can draw not only on public media information but on a variety of sources exclusive to the government.

From the beginning of the Daily Summary, current intelligence has logically, instinctively, and unavoidably focused on foreign developments of greatest significance to the US. Its first concern has been with events having an immediate impact on the US and developments calling for policy decisions. The "hot" issues--the crisis--demand treatment. Prime examples of "must" coverage are wars. In the lifetime of the daily, the two wars in which the US has been involved have regularly been given prominent coverage. Sometimes eclipsing wars are pressure tactics by our antagonists, such as the various Soviet squeeze plays on Berlin and the attempt to plant missiles in Cuba. Developments regarding our antagonists' military capabilities, and of course what we can divine of their intentions, have to be covered meticulously. All these are matters directly affecting US security.

One of the main purposes of the Bulletin is to guard official Washington against "surprises," particularly of the unpleasant variety.

Crises do not arise solely over issues of direct security significance; there are crises in diplomatic and economic relations between the US and its allies,

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and between other countries, with repercussions on the US. Moreover, intelligence does not live by crisis alone. To the extent that it is truly successful, it helps avoid crises. It is quite possible that the most important intelligence is non-critical in nature, even if crisis reporting tends to hog attention. In a crisis officials tend to be caught up by events; their capability of control is limited. On the other hand, if they can spot trouble coming in the future, they can plan carefully to meet, and perhaps, preclude it. It is this kind of "look ahead" that intelligence should provide.

Officials responsible for the conduct of foreign and defense policy cannot be adequately served only by information of a defensive nature, whether it concerns crises or future problems. For a full understanding of situations, they need to be informed of developments favorable to US interests and of opportunities for the US to promote its objectives. This is an important side of intelligence.

In general, intelligence reporting must cover all countries and situations where there is a US interest. This is not in fact a restrictive prescription. Although it varies enormously in degree, there is a US interest

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in every country in the world. This follows from our desire to avoid the outbreak of wars, which always hold a potential peril to the international community, to thwart the extension of our antagonists' influence, and to safeguard our economic interests.

The developments and situations that each country regards as most important to itself--usually its current major issues--are likely to have at least a potential impact on the country's political stability, economic and social welfare, defensive capabilities, or foreign policy. Consequently these issues must always be examined as possibly reportable subjects. Whether in a particular case the matter should be reported in an intelligence publication, and in what level of publication, depends on the impact it will have on the foreign country, and then on the US.

Obviously a change of government holds the potentiality for effecting many changes within a country and altering its relations with the outside world. Consequently orderly or sudden changes of government in even the smallest countries are normally dealt with, and analyzed, in intelligence publications. Since some changes could have an adverse effect on US interests, there is always an attempt to predict coups d'etat.

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Spotlighting the most important developments on all these subjects, the CIA daily has been published steadily since 1946 under the titles successively of Daily Summary, Current Intelligence Bulletin, and Central Intelligence Bulletin. In 1968, the Bulletin began to be issued in three versions graded in terms of importance and classification. The Bulletin was joined in 1961 by a new, more exclusive presidential daily called the President's Intelligence Checklist, later renamed the President's Daily Brief.

Although the mission of current intelligence began with the writing of the daily for the President, it was obviously not possible to relay all necessary intelligence via the daily. Many situations called for detailed elucidation and there was perhaps a natural desire to look at the development of events over a period of a week. Consequently the mission speedily expanded to the production of an assortment of periodicals and ad hoc papers for the President and other policy-makers. The OCI weekly and memoranda have a history only slightly shorter than that of the daily. The subject matter and focus of finished current intelligence vary according to the intended readers and their presumed needs, but there is a general similarity in the nature of all issuances. Whether they have a broad or narrow scope, whether they are concerned with long-term trends or only the events of yesterday, whether they are

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largely political, economic, or military, or a mixture, they all deal with foreign developments that do now, or could potentially, affect US interests.

The Bulletin normally covers the spot development. The Weekly Review looks at situations with more perspective. Its articles are likely to have more background material than Bulletin items, and they should be more analytical (though they are not always). As appropriate to the subject, a weekly article ought to clarify foreign objectives, identify trends, bring out the US interest, and project judiciously into the future.

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The adjunct to the Weekly known as the Special Report is a different creature from a regular weekly article. Although it is factually up to date, its purpose is not to relate the most recent developments, but to provide a broad (though not exhaustive) review of a current topic worthy of wide attention.

Intelligence memoranda follow no set pattern and are as long as necessary to convey their messages, usually sharply focused. One of their chief distinctions from Special Reports is that their dissemination is determined in each case, rather than being widespread and fixed as it is for Special Reports. The choice of the memorandum form, with its selected readers, is usually made for one or more of the following reasons: the report is not deemed to be of general interest, it is too long-- or even too short--for a Special Report, it is too highly classified or too delicate in subject matter, or it is required by the consumer before a Special Report could be turned out.

Apart from memoranda directed to particular consumers, current intelligence, in the main line set by its beginning as a report to the President, is by and large written for the generalist among policymakers. The usual Bulletin item or Weekly article does not carry factual or analytical

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material that would be new to people in other departments working on the same countries or problems, although a concise, organized presentation may be helpful even to the experts. The target readership is principally the top policymakers, who have to come to grips with each major problem as it emerges but who in any case want to keep up with outstanding world developments. Sometimes in the production process the objection is made that a proposed report is unnecessary because the officials handling the question already have the information. This argument ignores the fact that there are many high-level generalists who are not working on that particular matter but who are among our principal readers.

Occasionally there are valid objections to proposed current intelligence reporting because of parallel press coverage. Current intelligence should not normally be inhibited by press coverage; the main touchstone for intelligence should be the importance of the foreign development and the need for officials to be apprised of it. Even when events draw considerable press attention, officials, one hopes, want to know what CIA says on an all-source basis. CIA reporting ought to be more reliable than the public media, eliminating its distortions and inaccuracies, and it ought to be more concise. Moreover,

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in most cases CIA will have a unique analytical contribution. Despite all this, however, it must be admitted that there are times when press coverage is so satisfactory that there is nothing current intelligence can usefully do.

Although intelligence should not be written to defend or criticize policy, effective intelligence reporting calls for a knowledge of US interests and policies. Without such knowledge, there are no criteria for the selection of developments and their meaningful interpretation. The producers of intelligence do not have to be in personal agreement with current policies, or indeed have any feeling about them at all, but their reporting needs to illuminate foreign reaction to these policies. It is essential that policymakers get a straight story of how things are working out so that they can judge whether to continue on course or take a different tack.

Foreign developments in conformity with US interests and policies can be regarded as "favorable." Developments opposed to US interests and policies can be considered "unfavorable" or "threats." Additionally, there are many developments that do not necessarily fall into either category. Some of them, however, are of obvious importance, and hence are reportable because they are likely to produce eventual effects that will matter, one way or another,

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to the US. The Sino-Soviet border negotiations are an example. There may be no direct repercussion on US interests of particular developments in these talks, but they will probably affect the relationship between China and the USSR, which has great importance for the US.

This approach to criteria of reportability results in the following framework to encompass all current intelligence. The examples are drawn from various years.

I. Direct threats to the security of the US or its personnel abroad.

Examples:

- a. North Vietnamese intensify attacks on US bases.
- b. Soviets test ABM.
- c. New terrorist actions planned vs US personnel in Brazil.
- d. China develops thermonuclear weapon.
- e. Moscow demands Allies get out of Berlin. (1958)
- f. Soviets install missiles in Cuba. (1962)

II. Indirect threats to US security and threats to other US interests and policies.

- a. Japanese leftists oppose security pact with US.


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- b. East Germans harrass Berlin traffic.
- c. Malta gives Britain deadline for withdrawal.
- d. Violence increased along Israeli-Lebanon border.
- e. Chile refuses compensation for takeover of US copper companies.
- f. Challengers drop out of South Vietnam election campaign.
- g. NATO faces open dispute on the Greek question.

III. Favorable developments for US security, other interests, and policies.

- a. Soviet missile program suffers setback.
- b. China moderates its foreign policy positions.
- c. Turkish political crisis eases.
- d. Buddhists moderate attitude toward Saigon government.

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- g. New Libyan government is cool to Moscow.

IV. Other important developments.

- a. Dissatisfaction with Cambodian government increases.

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- b. Serious friction exists among ruling group in Algeria.
- c. Mujib faces many difficulties as he takes over in Bangladesh.
- d. Honduran president in shaky position.
- e. Factional fight continues in Finnish Communist party.
- f. Croat nationalism causing concern to Belgrade.

In selecting material for reporting under this last category, intelligence producers must guard against a natural enthusiasm for their subjects, which can lead them to write about events having too slight a bearing on any US interest. Where the connection with US interests cannot be easily perceived, it should be made explicit.

Miss. articles by

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